Riehl, A. Zu R. Hayms gedächtnis.--Schrader, W. Die seelenlehre der Griechen in der älteren lyrik.--Vaihinger, H. Die transcendentale deduktion der kategorien.--Rehmke, J. Wechselwirkung oder parallelismus?--Wentscher, M. Das problem der willensfreiheit bei Lotze.--Kühnemann, E. Über die grundlagen der lehre des Spinoza.--Volkelt, J. Die kunst des individualisierens in den dichtungen Jean Pauls.--Uphues, G. Über die idee einer pädagogik als bildungswissenschaft. Über die idee einer philosophie des christentums.--Lipps, T. Von der form der ästhetischen apperception.--Schwarz, H. Gefallen und lust.--Medicus, F. Die beiden prinzipien der (...) sittlichen beurteilung.--Reischle, M. Jesu worte von der ewigen bestimmung der menschenseele in religionsgeschichtlicher beleuchtung. (shrink)

Obituary of an Emory College Philosophy Professor.

One way of explaining Rudolf Carnap’s mature philosophical view is by drawing an analogy between his technical projects—like his work on inductive logic—with a certain kind of conceptual engineering. After all, there are many mathematical similarities between Carnap’s work in inductive logic and a number of results from contemporary confirmation theory, statistics and mathematical probability theory. However, in stressing these similarities, the conceptual dependence of Carnap’s inductive logic on his work on semantics is downplayed. Yet it is precisely the (...) conceptual resources made available to Carnap from his work on semantics which allows him to understand his work on inductive logic as a kind of conceptual engineering project. The aim of this paper is to elucidate this engineering analogy in light of Carnap’s mature views through the lens of both inductive logic and semantics. (shrink)

an der Universität Göttingen gehaltenen Vcwlesung über Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis,l ist annähernd voll­ ständig erhalten; die Blätter des V cwlesungsmanuskripts zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins liegen verstreut in den Konvoluten F I 6 und 2 F I 8 des Husserl-Archivs zu Löwen. Allerdings fußt der Erste Teil des Erstdrucks, dessen Bezeichnung als Die Vorlesungen über das innere Zeit­ bewußtsein aus dem Jahre 1905 gleichwohl auch in vcwliegender Neuausgabe beibehalten wurde, nur zum Teil noch, und auch (...) in diesem Teil mit be­ trächtlichen Abweichungen, auf dem Text des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs­ manuskripts des Jahres I905; und umgekehrt hat nur ein Teil des Textes des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs-Manuskripts - mit den erwähnten Abwand­ lungen - Eingang in den Ersten Teil des Erstdrucks gefunden. Wo der Text dieses Ersten Teils des Erstdrucks dem des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs­ manuskripts entspricht, wurde er er mit diesem verglichen, und ollensicht­ liche Irrtümer im Erstdruck wurden berichtigt; in den Textkritischen Anmer­ kungen ist dann mit dem Vermerk nach dem Ms. verbessert die Text­ fassung des Erstdrucks wiedergegeben. Ferner wurde in den Textkritischen Anmerkungen vcwliegender Neuausgabe überall der ursprüngliche und voll­ ständige· Text des Vorlesungsmanuskripts von I905 wiedergegeben, auf dessen Zusammenhang die entsprechenden Teile des Erstdrucks zurückgehen, wo dieser von ienem abweicht. Einige zum V cwlesungsmanuskript gehörige Blätter, deren Text sich iedoch nicht zusammenhängend dem übrigen einfügt, wurden im vcwliegenden Band unter B (S. 135-382) mit abgedruckt. Die 1 Vgl. oben die "Einleitung des Herausgebers", S. XIV-XVII. (shrink)

The Brentano-Meinong concept of self-presentation is discussed and defined. A property P is said to be self-presenting, i f and only if, P is necessarily such that, for every x, i f x has P and considers the question whether he has P, then it is evident to x that he has P. A definition of the purely psychological is propojsed. Then the following material epistemic principle is discussed and defended: A property P is self-presenting to a person x, i (...) f and only if, P is entailed by a purely psychological property of x. (shrink)

The Brentano-Meinong concept of self-presentation is discussed and defined. A property P is said to be self-presenting, i f and only if, P is necessarily such that, for every x, i f x has P and considers the question whether he has P, then it is evident to x that he has P. A definition of the purely psychological is propojsed. Then the following material epistemic principle is discussed and defended: A property P is self-presenting to a person x, i (...) f and only if, P is entailed by a purely psychological property of x. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Freedom describes Rudolf Steiner's path to freedom. It contains the nonconformist ideals of his youth that result from his study of mathematics, science, and philosophy culminating in a philosophy of life founded upon individualistic truth and ethical individualism. This is the first English translation and the only one sanctioned by Rudolf Steiner himself. Joint translators Prof. and Mrs. R. F. Alfred Hoernlé were selected for their outstanding qualifications. First published in 1916, it is based on (...) the original 1894 German "Die Philosophie der Freiheit". Other translations have been based on the 1918 revised German edition and renamed "The Philosophy Of Spiritual Activity" and "Intuitive Thinking As A Spiritual Path". This original edition includes inspiring passages about individualism that were removed from the book in 1918 and are missing in later translations: "We no longer believe that there is a norm to which we must all strive to conform." "If only we probe deep enough into the very heart of our being, there dwells something noble, something worthy of development." Learn all about Rudolf Steiner's The Philosophy Of Freedom at https: //philosophyoffreedom.com/. (shrink)

My dissertation explores the ways in which Rudolf Carnap sought to make philosophy scientific by further developing recent interpretive efforts to explain Carnap’s mature philosophical work as a form of engineering. It does this by looking in detail at his philosophical practice in his most sustained mature project, his work on pure and applied inductive logic. I, first, specify the sort of engineering Carnap is engaged in as involving an engineering design problem and then draw out the complications of (...) design problems from current work in history of engineering and technology studies. I then model Carnap’s practice based on those lessons and uncover ways in which Carnap’s technical work in inductive logic takes some of these lessons on board. This shows ways in which Carnap’s philosophical project subtly changes right through his late work on induction, providing an important corrective to interpretations that ignore the work on inductive logic. Specifically, I show that paying attention to the historical details of Carnap’s attempt to apply his work in inductive logic to decision theory and theoretical statistics in the 1950s and 1960s helps us understand how Carnap develops and rearticulates the philosophical point of the practical/theoretical distinction in his late work, offering thus a new interpretation of Carnap’s technical work within the broader context of philosophy of science and analytical philosophy in general. (shrink)

Brecht, A. The incompatibility of liberty and equality.--Possony, S. T. The procedural constitution.--Pelinka, A. Der unechte Parlamentarismus in Frankreich und Österreich.--Schambeck, H. Die Stellung der politischen Parteien nach österreichischem Verfassungsrecht.--Dunner, J. Democratic theory and civil disobedience.--Schäfer, F. Die Ausschussberatung im Deutschen Bundestag.--Willms, G. Miszellen aus der Gefangenschaft.--Kaase, M. Strukturen politischer Beteiligung.--Merkl, P. H. Party members and society in West Germany and Italy.--Kaltefleiter, W. Politische Form.--Zellentin, G. Konferenzdiplomatie und friedlicher Wandel in Europa.--Kammler, H. Kapitalistische Expansion und Exportmonopolismus.--Wildenmann, R. Wahlsysteme und Demokratie.